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ABSTRACT
This paper examines changes in the role that auditors play in corporate tax planning following recent
events, including the well-known accounting scandals, passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and
regulatory actions by the SEC and PCAOB.  On the whole, these events have increased the
sensitivity to and scrutiny of auditor independence.  We examine the effects of these events on the
market for tax planning, in particular the longstanding link between audit and tax services.  While
the effects are recent, they are already being seen in the data.  Specifically, there has already been
a dramatic shift in the market for tax planning away from obtaining tax planning services from one's
auditor.  We estimate that the ratio of tax fees to audit fees paid to the auditors of firms in the S&P
500 decline from approximately one in 2001 to one-fourth in 2004.  At the same time, we find no
evidence of a general decline in spending for tax services.  In sum, the evidence indicates a
decoupling of the longstanding link between audit and tax services, such that firms are shifting their
purchase of tax services away from their auditor and towards other providers.
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The Changing Role of Auditors in Corporate Tax Planning 
 
1.  Introduction 
This paper examines the changing role that auditors play in corporate tax planning in the face of 
the recent events, including the well-known accounting scandals, passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, and regulatory actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).  Although the events are recent, still being 
debated, and the data limited, one thing is clear in the preliminary data.  The amount of tax 
services that audit firms provide to their audit clients has declined dramatically during the period 
2001-2004.  Furthermore, most of the tax work appears to have shifted among accounting firms 
because the amount of tax work that accounting firms perform for non-audit clients has increased 
sharply.   
We find that in 2001, S&P 500 companies, on average, paid their auditors about the same 
fees for their audit work as they did for their tax work (i.e., the combination of tax compliance, 
tax advice and tax consulting).  Two years later in 2003, the S&P 500 were paying twice as much 
for audit work as tax work.  By 2004, we estimate that the average S&P 500 firm was paying 
their auditor four times more for audit work than tax work.  This striking shift has occurred 
because audit clients are both paying more for audit work and spending less for tax services from 
their auditor.  The total tax practice of the largest accounting firms (from both audit and non-
audit clients) has held steady during this period, indicating that that what we are observing is a 
shift in clients among the providers of tax service rather than a general decline in tax services.   
Several related events likely contributed to the decline in auditor-related tax services and 
the increase in non-auditor provided tax services.  A rash of accounting scandals in 2001 and 
2002 led to increased scrutiny of auditors and auditor independence.  Congress responded by   2
enacting Sarbanes-Oxley in the summer of 2002.
1  A primary purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley is to 
ensure (some would argue restore) the independence of the auditor.  To ensure that auditors are 
independent in fact and in appearance, and therefore are not facing conflicting incentives when 
issuing an audit opinion, the sweeping legislation, among other things, restricts the tax services 
that accountants can provide to their audit clients.
2  Specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley requires that 
before an auditor is retained to perform tax services, the client must seek and obtain specific 
approval from the audit committee of the board of directors.  No pre-approval is required when 
clients obtain tax services from a firm that is not their auditor.  Follow-on regulations from the 
SEC place further restrictions on auditors by prohibiting them from providing certain types of tax 
planning services to their audit clients.
3   Because accounting firms historically provided their 
audit clients with substantial tax planning, these restrictions are altering the process by which 
corporations manage their tax liabilities.   
Regulation, however, does not fully account for the decline in auditor-provided tax 
services.  Some companies have gone beyond the Sarbanes-Oxley restrictions.  They no longer 
accept any non-audit services from their audit firm, including tax work.  One reason for these 
self-imposed restrictions is to signal a high-quality audit, i.e., the auditor is not compromised by 
fees it receives from non-audit services.  Companies completely dropping non-audit services are 
attempting to disassociate themselves from the negative publicity of accounting scandals 
                                                           
1The nine months preceding the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley were marked with several major criminal investigations 
involving corporate managers.   Among these was Enron’s earnings restatement on November 8, 2001; Adelphia’s 
report of unbooked family loans on March 27, 2002; the tax evasion indictment of Tyco’s CEO on June 4, 2002; the 
arrest of ImClone’s CEO for insider trading on June 12, 2002; and WorldCom’s admission of earnings 
overstatements on June 25, 2002.   
2 Note that the restrictions are placed on the accounting firm, not on an individual auditor.  That is, a tax consultant 
working at an accounting firm is restricted in the services that he can provide an audit client, even if he had no role 
in the audit.  Likewise, tax consulting opportunities are limited, even if no one associated with the audit played any 
role in the tax plan.   
3 SEC Release No. 33-8183, Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence 
(2003). 
   3
involving perceived auditor compromise.  One such case is Enron, where Arthur Andersen 
reportedly received over $52 million in 2000, mostly from non-audit services (McLean and 
Elkind, 2003, p.145).  Shareholder pressure also may be contributing to the decline in non-audit 
services.  For example, the California Public Employees' Retirement System has a policy of 
opposing the election of audit committee members who approve non-audit services.
4  In addition, 
they generally vote against retaining auditors that provide non-audit services.
5  In sum, the 
combination of regulatory and self-imposed restrictions is decoupling the longstanding link 
between audit and tax services.   
Why did firms obtain most of their tax services from their audit firm prior to the 
accounting scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and regulatory changes by the SEC and PCAOB?  
The answer is that because all publicly-traded firms are required to have an audit and all 
privately-held businesses of any consequence acquire one, the firm conducting the audit 
historically enjoyed at least two significant advantages compared to other accounting firms.  
First, auditors learn a great deal about the client’s business during the course of the audit and 
operate on the “inside,” having access to the client’s internal financial information.  
Consequently, the auditor is often able to identify consulting opportunities, including tax 
consulting, more readily than other service providers.  Second, the auditor typically has a 
working relationship with both the tax director and the CFO, who historically were the key 
people involved in the selection of tax providers.  Often the CFOs and tax directors began their 
careers with the accounting firm that does the audit.  They therefore understand the firm’s audit 
and tax approach, and have longstanding, close relationships with the firm’s personnel.    
                                                           
4 See http://www.calpers-governance.org/viewpoint/speeches/anson041403.asp. 
5 See http://www.boardmember.com/network/index.pl?section=1024&article_id=11985&show=article.   4
Compared to non-accounting providers of tax services, specifically law firms, accounting 
firms also enjoy some advantages.  Because of long-standing financial accounting rules that are 
beyond the scope of this paper, whole classes of tax strategies (in general, those that defer 
taxable income or accelerate tax deductions) do not actually reduce the tax expense that shows 
up in the firm’s financial statements.
6  Paradoxically, this development means that only certain 
kinds of tax planning are actually useful at increasing the earnings that are reported to 
shareholders.  With experts in both financial reporting and tax planning, accounting firms have a 
competitive advantage over law firms in designing corporate tax plans that reduce the actual 
taxes paid in a manner that also translates into reduced tax expense (and increased earnings) in 
the financial statements.  Since earnings and earnings per share are viewed by CFOs as the most 
important determinants of share price (Graham et al., 2005), the ability to reduce taxes for 
financial accounting purposes is often critical to selling tax planning ideas.  
In addition, the financial reporting perspective of accountants has shaped corporate tax 
planning.  Accountants were central in positioning tax departments as corporate profit centers, 
where reducing effective tax rates was seen as a means of enhancing accounting earnings.  This 
synergy meshes nicely with the managerial goal of enhancing shareholder value since earnings 
are a key component in valuation.   
Accounting firms have also enjoyed advantages in providing tax services that require 
number crunching, something law firms typically do not do, and tax services that require 
coordination across offices in different countries, as the largest accounting firms have global 
footprints that dwarf those of even the largest law firms.  On the other hand, law firms have had 
                                                           
6 For details, see Appendix 2.2 of Scholes, et al. 2005.  These rules are contained in Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS) 109, which was promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).  
The FASB is the private rule-making body primarily responsible for promulgating Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP).   5
an advantage in providing high-end legal analysis such as writing opinion letters and, naturally, 
in tax litigation.  Law firms also have the advantage of attorney client privilege, although it has 
been curtailed to some extent in recent court cases involving tax shelters. 
Over time, accounting firms became key providers of corporate tax expertise to their 
audit clients, and accountants became the leading designers of many corporate tax plans.  One 
recent example is the role accountants played in the proliferation of corporate tax shelters around 
the turn of the millennium.  Many of the alleged shelters were developed by the largest 
accounting firms (Bankman, 2004).  It is not obvious how corporate tax planning would have 
evolved without the central role of accountants.  Similarly, it is not apparent how it will evolve 
with the pressure to decouple audit and tax so profoundly altering the process and systems by 
which corporations approach taxes.  While the future is hazy, we will nevertheless hazard three 
predictions, which should be testable with more research and more data. 
First, there will be disruptions to the tax function that should, to some extent, increase the 
cost of tax planning and increase corporate taxes paid.  The development and implementation of 
a tax plan for a large corporation is a complex undertaking.  It requires extensive knowledge of 
the company, its history and how the organization operates.  It requires the coordination of 
parties with diverse interests and information, involving domestic and foreign operations across 
multiple segments of the business, including production, marketing, finance, financial reporting, 
management, human resources, and technology.  Various professionals— accountants, attorneys, 
economists, bankers, insurers, and appraisers, both within and outside the company—provide the 
tax expertise.  Any major disruption to the team of tax professionals, such as the loss of tax 
consultants within the auditing firm, should make it more costly for firms to reduce their tax 
liabilities.   6
To test this prediction, one would need data on taxes paid by corporations following the 
reduction in auditor-provided tax services.  One would predict that taxes paid would increase the 
most in those firms that had the largest declines in auditor-provided tax services.  There also 
could be a general time effect on tax collections to the extent that the tax industry is experiencing 
a period of conservatism following the accounting scandals, Sarbanes-Oxley and the recent 
crackdown on corporate tax shelters by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
Two, we expect to see the tax provision (the tax expense reported in the financial 
statements) as an increased source of conflict between the auditor and the client.  Because 
financial statement auditors today are less likely to be reviewing the tax strategy developed by a 
colleague down the hall, they are more likely to question the tax strategy.  All else equal, we 
expect that auditors will require their clients to record more tax cushion (a financial accounting 
reserve for tax positions that may be disallowed by the IRS) for a given level of aggressive tax 
positions than they did in the past.  We expect that auditors will also maintain increasingly 
detailed audit workpapers related to the tax provision and that these workpapers will serve as a 
roadmap for the IRS to the client’s most sensitive tax positions.   
Three, we predict significant long-run changes to the accounting industry.  The synergies 
that have long kept audit and tax professionals together in the same firms are now eroded.  Given 
the shift away from obtaining tax services from one’s audit firm, it is possible that there is no net 
positive synergy to having large tax practices together with the audit firms.  This is far from 
certain, but we predict that over time portions of the Big Four tax practices will be sold or spun-
off to entities that do not face the regulatory challenges the auditors face.   In addition to stand-
alone tax practices, potential buyers of parts of the Big Four tax practices include law firms, 
strategy consulting firms, human resource consulting firms, IT consulting firms, and even banks.    7
Even without a sale or spin-off, portions of the Big Four tax practice may migrate to these same 
potential buyers as they enter the market or expand their existing tax services.  Time will be 
necessary to test this prediction.  We should note, however, that the short-run data do not support 
our long-run prediction.  The total tax practices of the Big Four are currently expanding, not 
contracting, as they pick up business from each other’s audit clients. 
The remainder of the paper develops as follows: The next section provides background 
on the related literature and on the legislative and regulatory changes affecting auditor provided 
tax services.  Section 3 provides some preliminary empirical evidence in terms of tax and audit 
fees.  Section 4 speculates on the ultimate effects of the changes in tax service providers on the 
structure of the accounting industry.  Section 5 discusses possible unintended consequences of 
Sarbanes-Oxley on aggregate corporate taxes.  Concluding remarks follow. 
 
2.  Background  
2.1.  Related literature 
Prior research has tended to ignore the role of auditor-provided tax services.  The closest 
stream of research among tax papers examines the interplay between tax planning and financial 
reporting (see review in Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001; examples in Scholes et al., 2005).  That 
literature, however, tends to focus either on firm-level coordination between tax planning and 
financial reporting incentives (e.g., LIFO versus FIFO) or on capital market responses to 
earnings in the presence of book-tax differences (e.g., Hanlon, 2005).  When auditors are 
mentioned in the tax literature, they almost always are employees of the Internal Revenue 
Service, rather than accounting firms.  In short, tax papers tend to ignore the role of the financial 
statement auditor.      8
In the accounting literature, numerous papers study the market for auditors (e.g., Antle et 
al., 2002; Whisenant, 2003), auditing and the capital markets (e.g., Francis et al., 1999; Francis 
and Ke, 2004) and auditor independence (e.g., Antle, 1984; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; DeFond et al., 
2002; Frankel et al., 2002; Kinney et al., 2004; Reynolds et al., 2004; Simunic, 1984).  The 
independence literature is mixed on whether non-audit services compromise auditors.  Using 
several tests for the presence of compromised auditors (e.g., the extent of earnings management) 
Frankel et al, 2002 conclude that having auditor provide non-audit services impairs auditor 
independence.  Conversely, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) finds that the results in Frankel et al. (2002) 
are sensitive to research design choices.  Similarly, Reynolds et al. (2004) finds no relation 
between non-audit services and discretionary accruals after controlling for certain firm 
characteristics.  In a sample of financially-stressed manufacturing companies, Geiger and Rama 
(2003) find no association between non-audit fees and likelihood of receiving a going-concern 
audit opinion (loosely speaking, a going-concern audit opinion indicates that the firm may face 
financial distress).  On the whole, the evidence is inconclusive whether non-audit services impair 
auditor independence. 
Not surprisingly, researchers are beginning to analyze Sarbanes-Oxley from numerous 
angles (e.g., Asthana et al., 2004; Cohen et al., 2004; Griffen and Lont, 2005; Lai, 2003).  
However, we are aware of only one other study that examines the changing market for auditor-
provided tax services, Omer et al. (2005).  Among other things, that study finds a decline in 
auditor-provided tax services in 2002, the last year of its sample.   9
 
2.2.  Legislative and regulatory changes affecting auditor-provided tax services  
To understand the legislative and regulatory changes to what auditors can do, it is 
important to understand the two categories of tax services that accounting firms typically 
provide.  The first category of tax services are those that are not essential to the completion of 
the audit, including tax compliance, tax advice and tax consulting.  Tax compliance involves 
filing tax returns and providing other information to the taxing authorities.  Tax advice is 
responding to inquiries about the specific treatment of transactions or other taxable endeavors.  
Tax consulting is the design and implementation of tax strategies designed to manage tax 
liabilities.  Of the three, consulting is the highest margin activity and includes profitable 
engagements such as restructuring organizations, shifting income across jurisdictions or time, or 
reclassifying the tax treatment of transactions.  As detailed below, Sarbanes-Oxley discourages, 
and in some cases prohibits, accounting firms from providing these tax services to their audit 
clients.  
The other services that tax professionals provide are those that are an essential part of the 
audit.  Tax experts typically assist their audit brethren in the review of what is called the “tax 
provision,” i.e., the income tax expense in the corporation’s financial statements.  The tax 
provision is not the actual taxes paid during that year.  Rather, it estimates the total taxes over the 
life of the firm related to current year’s activities.
7  Auditing the provision estimates require 
extensive knowledge of both tax law and generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  
Because reviewing the provision is part of the audit, Sarbanes-Oxley does not prohibit auditors 
                                                           
7 There are some exceptions to this general rule.   For example, the tax provision can be affected by revisions in 
deferred tax assets and liabilities due to changes in tax rates, changes in the APB 23 election for permanently 
reinvested foreign earnings, changes in the valuation allowance, changes in the tax cushion and settlements with the 
IRS.   10
from provision work.  However, as discussed below, Sarbanes-Oxley indirectly affects the nature 
of the provision work.   
Sarbanes-Oxley builds on three principles of auditor independence: (1) the auditor cannot 
audit his own work; (2) the auditor cannot function as part of management; (3) the auditor cannot 
serve in an advocacy role for the client.
8  In other words, Sarbanes-Oxley is designed to ensure 
that the auditor remains independent, i.e., not conflicted in its audit of the financial reports.  To 
that end, Sarbanes-Oxley specifically prohibits the firm that provides the audit from also 
providing: (1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial 
statements of the audit client; (2) financial information systems design and implementation; (3) 
appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; (4) actuarial 
services; (5) internal audit outsourcing services; (6) management functions or human resources; 
(7) broker or dealer, investment advisor, or investment banking services; (8) legal services and 
expert services unrelated to the audit; (9) any other service deemed by regulators to be 
impermissible.   
Sarbanes-Oxley does not prohibit auditors from providing tax services to their audit 
clients and, in fact, specifically identifies tax services as services that the auditor can perform so 
long as pre-approval is obtained from the client’s audit committee (Goodman, 2004).
9  
Nonetheless, Congress has given both the SEC and the newly-created PCAOB, discussed below, 
the authority to write rules regulating auditor independence.  In 2003, following passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC revised its auditor independence regulations.  The revisions 
continue the SEC’s longstanding position that accountants can provide audit clients with certain 
                                                           
8 The SEC based its November 2000 amendments to the auditor independence rules on these same principles.  They 
also guide the PCAOB, which Sarbanes-Oxley created to further oversee auditor-provided tax services.  In addition, 
a Treasury Regulation known as Circular 230 regulates some aspects of tax practice, e.g., writing opinion letters. 
9 If Congress had been sufficiently concerned about tax impairing auditor independence, then it could have 
prohibited firms from offering both tax and audit services, much like the Glass-Steagall Act did for commercial and 
investment banking.  See Kroszner, 1998; Kroszner and Rajan, 1994; and Kroszner and Rajan, 1997.   11
tax services.  The SEC considers tax services unique among non-audit services, noting that 
auditor-provided tax services predate the Congressional passage of the securities laws in the 
1930s.  The SEC, however, has ruled that independence is impaired by representing an audit 
client before a tax court, district court, or federal court of claims.
10 
The PCAOB was established by Sarbanes-Oxley as a new regulator of auditors.  The 
PCAOB has proposed regulations that, among other things, delineate between acceptable and 
unacceptable tax services.
11  It has ruled that auditor independence is compromised if the auditor 
participates in corporate tax planning under confidentiality or involving a “listed” transaction.
12  
In addition, the PCAOB forbids the accounting firm from participating in “aggressive” tax 
planning with its audit clients.  Aggressive tax planning is defined as any plan or opinion where 
(a) the auditor provides any service related to the plan or opinion, (b) the client did not initiate 
the idea, (c) a significant purpose of the idea was to avoid taxes, and (d) the plan has a less than 
fifty-fifty chance of prevailing if challenged by the IRS.  The PCAOB restrictions even extend to 
personal tax return preparation, barring the audit firm from preparing the personal tax returns for 
corporate officers with oversight authority over financial statements (Gary, 2004).   
In addition to the SEC and PCAOB auditor regulations, Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits the 
audit firm from providing other tax services (e.g., ones that are not already prohibited) unless the 
audit committee approves the services in advance on a case-by-case basis.  Audit committee 
approval can be a significant hurdle for at least four reasons.  First, a primary responsibility of 
                                                           
10 See Section B. 11 of http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm#footbody_103 for more details about the SEC’s 
position about auditor-provided tax services. 
11 PCAOB Interim Professional Auditing Standards, issued April 18, 2003 and approved by the SEC on April 25, 
2003. 
12 A “listed” transaction is one identified by the IRS as structured for the significant purpose of tax avoidance or 
evasion.  Participants in listed transactions are required to disclose expected tax benefits and the identities and 
nature of involvement of all parties to the transaction.  Among the 31 transactions currently listed are sale-in lease-
out transactions, intercompany financing through partnerships, offsetting foreign currency option contracts, abusive 
foreign tax credit transactions, and S corporation ESOP abuses.     12
the audit committee is to ensure that the auditor’s independence is not compromised (potentially 
resulting in a failed audit).  Thus, audit committees are predisposed toward limiting non-audit 
utilization of the audit firm.  Second, audit committees historically have had little, if any, tax 
responsibility.  It is unclear that corporate boards will add tax experts just to facilitate audit 
committee approval of auditor-provided tax services.  Third, tax plans often demand rapid 
implementation for maximum effectiveness.  To the extent audit committees cannot respond 
quickly, the audit firm may be precluded from some time-sensitive tax plans or dominated by 
non-auditor providers.  Fourth, ignoring these tax approval responsibilities, Sarbanes-Oxley has 
already substantially increased the workloads of audit committees.  Thus, it is unclear whether 
audit committees will place high priority on approving auditor-provided tax services.  All in all, 
requiring audit committee pre-approval discourages firms from retaining their auditor to provide 
tax services.   
 
2.3.  The Tax Provision as a New Source of Conflict 
Suppose a company adopts a tax plan designed to permanently reduce its taxes (as 
compared with inter-temporal shifting).  The tax savings from the plan will only boost book 
income if the tax provision is reduced.  Recall that the tax provision refers to the tax expense 
reported in the financial statements.  The tax provision is not the same as the actual taxes 
currently paid because the tax provision estimates the total taxes over the life of the firm related 
to the current year’s financial reporting revenues and expenses.  Thus, temporary differences 
between tax and financial accounting income, such as accelerated tax depreciation, have no   13
effect on the amount of tax expense reported for financial reporting purposes.
13  If the only 
difference between tax and financial reporting income was due to accelerated depreciation for 
tax purposes, then financial reporting tax expense would exceed the actual tax liability in the 
early years of the asset’s life.  The pattern would reverse in the later years of the asset’s life and 
over the entire life of the asset the cumulative tax expense for tax and financial reporting would 
be equal.  On the other hand, permanent differences between tax and financial reporting, such as 
tax-exempt interest or non-deductible fines and penalties, do affect financial reporting tax 
expense. 
Even when a tax plan creates a permanent difference and would seemingly reduce 
financial reporting tax expense, if the auditor does not believe that the tax plan will prevail under 
the scrutiny of the taxing authorities, he may not allow the booking of the tax benefit in the 
financial statements.  In other words, if the auditor believes that the taxes foregone in the current 
year will be paid in future years after an IRS audit he may require the client to record a tax 
cushion (a reserve) to keep the tax provision from being understated.  Because financial 
reporting earnings are important to a company’s valuation, if the auditor does not permit a 
reduction in the provision, then the tax plan is less valuable and may not be marketable at all.    
Before the changes brought about by Sarbanes-Oxley and related events, purchasing tax 
services from one’s auditor for the most part eliminated concerns that the auditor would oppose 
the firm’s book treatment of the tax plan because the tax consultants would not promote a 
product that the auditors in their firm would not support.  Since the same firm handled the tax 
and audit work, accounting firms were ideally positioned to sell corporate tax shelters.  Auditors 
                                                           
13 The composition of tax expense, however, will be affected.  Tax expense for financial reporting is composed of 
current tax expense and deferred tax expense.  Temporary differences between tax and financial reporting income 
give rise to deferred tax expense.  See Scholes et al. (2005) for details.   14
were not necessarily compromised under these arrangements, but the potential for conflicts of 
interest existed, and the perception of compromise was unavoidable.   
The shift away from hiring one’s audit firm for tax services has substantially reduced 
these arrangements.  Consequently, auditors today are less likely to be faced with attesting to the 
propriety of aggressive tax plans originated by their own firms.  Instead, with the audit-tax link 
broken, the auditor’s interests are contrary to those of the tax service provider.  The tax planner 
needs a favorable tax and financial reporting outcome to promote his tax idea.  The auditor, 
however, will be concerned that the actual taxes over the life of the firm may exceed those 
reported in the financial statements.  The auditor has no financial interest in the success of the tax 
plan.  Since the company must have an audit and its auditor cannot be conflicted by the success 
of the tax plan, the auditor today wields unprecedented clout in determining the tax strategies 
that the firm undertakes and how it accounts for them. 
Consequently, the auditor now impedes, rather than assists, corporate tax avoidance.  In 
fact, Hardesty (2004) intimates that with tax shelters, it is now easier to prevail in an IRS audit 
than to convince an auditor to accept favorable accounting.  This outcome results from two 
influences, namely information and time.  The auditor is more likely to know about the tax 
position and can command more cooperation and disclosure than the IRS can.  In addition, 
pressure from the auditor to have more documentation supporting the tax provision and the 
reserves or “tax cushion” for future IRS audit adjustments is likely to greatly increase the ease 
with which the IRS can find aggressive tax positions.
14  Furthermore, legal delays of years that 
                                                           
14 The tax cushion is an increase in current tax expense beyond actual current tax payments to account for tax 
positions the firm has taken but believes it may lose upon IRS audit.  In a related development beyond the scope of 
this paper, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has recently proposed changes to the financial 
accounting treatment of “uncertain tax positions.”   15
increase the costs of IRS investigation are not possible with the auditor because the large SEC 
registrants are required to release their financial statements within 60 days of year-end.  
In short, a (perhaps unintended) consequence of the pressure not to hire one’s auditor for 
tax planning is that the auditor has switched from opposing to aiding the taxing authorities.  The 
result of this role reversal should be increased taxes for financial reporting to the extent that 
auditors have become more conservative when reviewing the provisions of audit clients. In 
addition, the chilling effect on the ability to record the benefits of tax planning in the financial 
statements should reduce the amount and aggressiveness of tax planning and increase actual 
corporate tax payments. 
 
3.  Initial Evidence from Audit Fees 
This section documents initial changes in auditor-provided tax services among the largest 
U.S. corporations.  The operative word here is “initial.”  Because the accounting industry appears 
to be in transition from the effects of the accounting scandals, Sarbanes-Oxley, and related 
regulatory changes it is too soon to know for sure how extensive the long-run effects will be.  
However, these preliminary findings provide some sense of the magnitude of change.  The 
remainder of this section details the fees paid by the largest U.S. companies to their auditors 
from 2001 to 2003.   
 
3.1.  Audit and Tax Fee Data 
The primary tests compare the fees that a company pays to its auditors for audit work 
with the fees that it pays them for tax work.  We collect the fee information from disclosures in 
the firms’ proxy statements.  In January 2003, the SEC required companies to disclose a finer 
breakdown of the fees paid to their auditor: audit fees, audit-related fees, tax fees and all other   16
fees.  Before the rule change, tax fees were typically aggregated with other non-audit fees in the 
proxy statement disclosures. The finer partition disclosures were required for years ending after 
December 15, 2003, but corporations were required to report two years of information.  Many 
companies chose to adopt the disclosure early and included information for 2001 and 2002 in 
their 2002 proxy statements.  These early adopters are the companies that we principally analyze 
in this study.   
The SEC defines “Audit Fees” as the total fees for professional accounting services for 
the audit or other services related to statutory or regulatory filings.  “Audit-Related Fees” are 
payment for “…assurance and related services by the principal accountant that are reasonably 
related to the performance of the audit...”  Throughout the study, we compare the tax fees both 
with the audit fees alone (“audit fees”) and also with the audit fees combined with the audit-
related fees (“expanded audit fees”).  Inferences are similar for both measures.   
“Tax Fees” include fees for tax compliance, tax advice and tax planning, which is this 
paper’s definition of tax services.  The tax fees do not include review of the tax provision.  Those 
fees are included in the audit fees.  “All Other Fees” are for products and services provided by 
the auditor and not included in the other three categories.  We largely ignore these fees in our 
analysis.  See the Appendix for a reproduction of Allstate’s auditor fee information in its 2002 
financial statements. 
Because the fee classifications are self-reported (as is all other financial statement data), 
the empirical analysis below assumes that corporations can segregate the fees they pay to their 
auditors into these different categories and furthermore that they do so.  To the extent the fee 
data are unreliable or manipulated in some manner to affect users of the financial statements, the 
results may be erroneous.  We have no reason to think that the data are misleading but the   17
possibility exists.  Furthermore, if the precision in the categorical classification has changed over 
the 2001-2003 period, this also could introduce error into the study.   
 
3.2.  Sample Selection 
We draw our sample from the Standard and Poor’s 500 as of December 31, 2003.  We 
exclude the 16 companies that do not detail their audit fees for 2001, 2002 and 2003 and the 235 
companies that do not report the tax fees paid to their auditor for 2001, 2002 and 2003.  One 
other company is dropped because data are missing from Compustat.  Our sample consists of the 
remaining 248 companies that report both the audit and tax fees that they paid to their auditor in 
all three years.  By definition, all of these firms adopted the SEC disclosures early.   
If the companies that adopt early are systematically different from other firms, then our 
selection criteria may introduce bias.  To assess how representative our sample is, we compare 
the 248 early adopters to the 247 S&P 500 firms that did not adopt early and for which we have 
complete data.   
We find that the early adopters are larger.  In 2003, on average, early adopters’ assets 
were 159 percent greater; sales 164 percent higher; and market capitalization 174 percent larger 
than those of other S&P 500 firms.  Sales and market capitalization are significantly different at 
conventional levels.  Book-to-market ratios, however, are insignificantly different (42 percent for 
early adopters in 2003 versus 44 percent for other firms).  Both early adopters and other firms are 
evenly distributed across sectors.  
More importantly, we find no difference in the tax-to-audit ratios between early adopters 
and other firms for 2002 and 2003.  By definition, the early adopters are the only firms that 
disclosed fee information for 2001.  However, all firms had to disclose audit and tax fees for   18
2002 and 2003.  When we compare the tax-to-audit ratios for 2002 and 2003, we find no 
significant difference.  In 2002, the mean ratio for the early adopters is 0.71 versus 0.60 for the 
other firms.  In 2003, the mean ratio for the early adopters is 0.48 versus 0.47 for the other firms.  
In summary, we find no evidence to suggest that the tax and audit fees of the early adopters are 
systematically different than those for other firms.        
As expected, the Big Four accounting firms dominate the auditing market for the sample.  
For the three years combined in the study, both Ernst & Young and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
audited 32 percent of the firms.  Deloitte & Touche audited 20 percent, and KPMG 11 percent.  
Arthur Andersen audited 10 percent of the sample in 2001.  Arthur Andersen folded the 
following year with all of their S&P 500 clients scattering among the remaining Big Four firms.   
Eight companies changed auditors in 2001; 27 in 2002; and four in 2003.  Twenty-five of 
the 2002 changes were Arthur Andersen clients who were forced to change after Arthur 
Andersen’s demise.  Thus, the sample only experienced 14 non-Andersen switches over the three 
years or 0.6 percent annually.  To ensure that fee changes are not simply caused by changes in 
the auditors or by the forced Arthur Andersen’s switches, we repeat our analysis excluding firms 
that experienced an auditor change.  Inferences are unaltered. 
 
3.3.  Empirical Analysis 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 248 S&P 500 companies for which we have 
data from 2001, 2002 and 2003.  The mean (median) firm in 2003 had a market capitalization of 
$25 ($10) billion, assets of $48 ($15) billion and sales of $16 ($8) billion.  Both market value 
and sales show a dip in 2002, lingering effects of the 2001 recession.    19
  Of more central interest to this study is the audit and tax fees paid to the auditing firm.  
Table 2 shows that from 2001 to 2003 the mean (median) Audit Fees grew by 43 (30) percent, 
from $4.0 ($2.3) million to $5.7 ($3.0) million.  Mean (median) Audit-Related Fees declined by 
12 (17) percent, from $1.7 ($0.72) million to $1.5 ($0.60) million.  One possible explanation for 
the decline in audit-related fees is that some firms are no longer purchasing their audit-related 
services from their auditor.  Combining Audit and Audit-Related Fees to form Expanded Audit 
Fees, we find mean (median) expanded audit fees rose by 26 (26) percent, from $5.7 ($3.1) 
million to $7.2 ($3.9) million.  Meanwhile, from 2001 to 2003, mean (median) Tax Fees for 
auditor-provided tax services tumbled by 20 (27) percent, from $3.2 ($1.5) million to $2.5 ($1.1) 
million.  These findings are consistent with companies voluntarily reducing their demand for 
auditor-provided tax services.
15  
The combination of increased Audit Fees and decreased Tax Fees halves the mean 
(median) ratio of tax-to-audit fees, from 96 (68) percent in 2001 to 48 (36) percent in 2003.    
Similarly, when we compute the ratio using Expanded Audit Fees, the mean (median) ratio falls 
from 68 (49) percent to 39 (31) percent.  Untabulated results show that the decrease in the ratio 
occurred for the firms that relied most heavily on their auditors for tax services.  To demonstrate 
this difference, we split the sample on the median ratio in 2001, using Audit Fees in the 
denominator.  The 124 firms above the median had an average ratio of 1.6.  The 124 firms below 
the median had an average ratio of 0.3.  Two years later the ratio for the above-median group had 
slipped to 0.7.  The below-median group was unchanged at 0.3.  Although regression toward the 
                                                           
15 As an aside, All Other Fees fell precipitously with a mean (median) decline of 88 (95) percent, from $3.7 ($0.4) 
million to $0.5 ($0.0) million.  This slump in All Other Fees is consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley restrictions on non-
audit services, companies no longer looking to auditors for services, other than audit and tax work, and auditors 
divesting their consulting practices.    20
mean may explain part of this decline, it appears unlikely to account for all of it as there was no 
regression to the mean for the below-median firms.  
  The tax-to-audit ratios fell steadily from 2001 to 2003.  Initial reports indicate that the 
decline continued in 2004.  The Public Accounting Report (April 29, 2005) reported that the 430 
Fortune 500 companies, for which data had been disclosed, paid 54 percent more for audit work 
in 2004 than they paid in 2003.
16  They added that the companies paid their auditors 11 percent 
less for tax work in 2004 than in 2003.
17 
Assuming that these 430 Fortune 500 companies are comparable with the S&P 500 for 
which we have 2003 data, we estimate that the 2004 tax-to-audit ratio was 0.26 or almost half the 
ratio in 2003.
18  In other words, on average, the audit fees from audit clients were four times 
larger than the tax fees from them.  In short, providing tax services to publicly-traded audit 
clients is a significantly diminished revenue source for the major accounting firms. 
Initial audits of internal control documentation, as required by section 404 of Sarbanes-
Oxley were responsible for much of the increase in 2004 audit fees.  Because it was the first year 
of section 404 documentation, 2004 may have been an aberration.  However, a November 2004 
Corporate Executive Board survey reported that only 12 percent of corporations expected their 
Sarbanes-Oxley costs to abate in 2005.
19  So, it is not clear that the tax-to-audit ratio will 
rebound in the near future.  For now, the audit so dominates all other sources of fees from audit 
clients that actual or perceived audit compromise seems highly unlikely.   
                                                           
16 Audit fees soared even higher for Fortune 501 to Fortune 1000 companies with an average increase of 75 percent. 
17 The article specifically identified tax work for audit clients as one fee area “getting pinched for auditors.”   
18 Dropping Table 2’s 2003 Tax Fees of $2.53 million by another 11 percent produces estimated 2004 Tax Fees of 
$2.25 million. Increasing Table 2’s 2003 audit fees of $5.70 million by 54 percent yields estimated 2004 Audit Fees 
of 8.78.  $2.53 divided by $8.78 is 0.26. 
19 The survey results can be found at 
http://www.cfo.executiveboard.com/Images/CTLR/PDF/Key%20Insights%20from%20MHF.pdf on the fifth page of 
a report entitled, “SOX 404 Triggering Delayed Filings and CEO Turnover.”  
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3.4.  Analysis of Big 4 Audit and Tax Fees 
Further examination of detailed information from the Big Four accounting firms confirms 
the diminished role for auditor-provided tax services.  In private conversations with top 
management at one of the Big Four accounting firms, we were told that approximately three-
quarters of their tax work was conducted for audit accounts for 2002.  That figure declined 7 
percent in 2003, another 7 percent in 2004 and will decline another 3 percent for 2005.  Thus, 
they estimate that about 60 percent of their tax work is now with audit clients.  They anticipate 
continuing erosion of their audit-client tax work until the percentage levels around 50 percent or 
slightly less.   
These managers also asserted regional and industry differences in the retention of 
auditors for tax work.  Companies in the Southwest and in the financial services industries are 
more likely to retain their auditors for tax services.  They attribute the reticence of the financial 
service industry to the longstanding close relationship required between the auditors and the tax 
consultants in the regulated industries.  In other words, they claim that the audit-tax coordination 
required for statutory filings in the regulated industries increase the costs of decoupling the 
auditor and the tax professional. 
This assertion is consistent with evidence at another Big Four firm, Ernst & Young.  In 
their 2004 review, Ernst & Young reports that audit clients now account for 63 percent of their 
business, down from 80 percent in 2000.  This decline is remarkable for at least two reasons.  
First, the shift toward non-audit clients is largely limited to publicly-traded firms.  Privately-held 
businesses are mostly unaffected by Sarbanes-Oxley and usually have no need to signal 
uncompromised audits.  Second, fees from audits have soared in recent years.  Thus, for the   22
percentage of business from audit accounts to have declined by 17 percentage points (from 80 
percent to 63 percent), at least one of two changes must have happened: (1) work for non-audit 
clients has soared (i.e., doing non-audit work for other firms’ audit clients); (2) non-audit work 
for the firm’s audit clients has plunged.  More likely both conditions have occurred.  That is, 
Ernst & Young’s non-audit professionals are winning work from other firms’ audit clients, and 
Ernst and Young’s audit clients are looking to other firms for their tax and consulting services. 
To quantify these shifts, we reviewed Ernst & Young revenues by business lines.  In 
2000, we estimate that 60-87 percent of Ernst & Young’s tax work was done for audit clients.  
By 2004, we estimate no more than 21 percent of their tax work was for audit firms.  In short, if 
our estimates are accurate, most of Ernst & Young’s tax work now comes from non-audit clients.  
Even if our estimates somewhat overstate the shift, the data still suggest a radical decline in tax 
work for audit clients in recent years.
20 
 
                                                           
20 For the year ended June 2000, their Assurance business line (which should comprise audit and audit-related 
services) generated $5.2 billion or 57 percent of worldwide revenues.  Assume that 90 percent of these audit services 
were provided to audit clients and recall that 80 percent of their 2000 work was conducted on audit clients.  This fact 
pattern implies that another 29 [80 percent less (90 percent of 57 percent)] percentage points of audit revenues (or 
$2.6 billion) must have come from their other three business lines (Tax, Transaction Advisory and Other).   
Next, we attempt to estimate upper and lower bounds for auditor-provided tax work.  Suppose no 
Transaction Advisory or Other services were provided to audit clients.  Then, since Tax generated total fees of $3.0 
billion, the maximum percentage of tax work on audit accounts in 2000 was 87 percent ($2.6÷$3.0).  Conversely, 
suppose all Transaction Advisory services of $0.6 billion and Other services of $0.2 billion were conducted for audit 
clients, then the minimum percentage of tax work on audit accounts in 2000 was 60 percent [($2.6-$0.6-$0.2)÷$3.0].  
In summary, the data are consistent with 60-87 percent of Ernst & Young’s tax fees in 2000 coming from audit 
clients. 
Let’s compare those figures with 2004 data.  For the year ended June 2004, the Assurance business line 
generated $9.0 billion (62 percent of worldwide revenues), up 72 percent from 2000.  With 63 percent of Ernst & 
Young’s 2004 work conducted on audit clients, if we continue to assume that 90 percent of the audit services were 
provided to audit clients, then only 6 percentage points of audit revenues (or $0.9 billion) came from their other 
three business lines (Tax, Transaction Advisory and Other).  Again, suppose no Transaction Advisory or Other 
services were provided to audit clients.  Then, since Tax generated total fees of $4.3 billion, (up 27 percent from 
2000), the maximum percentage of tax work on audit accounts in 2000 was 21 percent ($0.9÷$4.3).  Conversely, if 
all of Ernst & Young’s non-audit, non-tax services (Transaction Advisory services of $1.1 billion and Other services 
of $0.2 billion) were for audit clients, then none of their tax work related to audit accounts.   
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3.5.  Has the Overall Amount of Corporate Tax Work Declined? 
An alternative explanation for the declining tax-to-audit ratios is that corporations are 
purchasing fewer tax services in total.  In other words, perhaps auditor-provided tax work is not 
declining alone.  Rather, accountants are providing less tax services to all clients, including their 
non-audit clients.   
The Big Four data reject this proposition.  In Ernst & Young’s case, worldwide tax fees 
from both audit and non-audit clients rose 27 percent from 2000 to 2004.  Although this increase 
pales in comparison to the 72 percent leap in worldwide audit fees, it is consistent with Ernst & 
Young continuing to generate large fees from tax work, albeit perhaps not for audit clients.  Ernst 
& Young, however, reports worldwide fees.  If tax work outside the U.S. soared, then these 
calculations may mask an underlying shrinkage in U.S. tax revenues.  To test this possibility, we 
turn to financial information from another Big Four firm, Deloitte & Touche. 
Deloitte & Touche reported U.S. tax fees of $1.2 billion for the year ended May 2002.  
Two years later, total U.S. tax fees were $1.8 billion, a 43 percent jump.  During the same period 
U.S. audit revenues rose 50 percent from $1.8 billion to $2.8 billion.  Thus, the Deloitte & 
Touche data suggest that their U.S. tax work is not receding at all.  In fact, it appears to be 
growing at a rapid pace, although probably much stronger for non-audit clients, than for audit 
accounts.    
We also find evidence of a sharp increase in non-U.S. tax work.  From 2002 to 2004, 
Deloitte & Touche’s worldwide tax revenues leapt 58 percent (from $2.4 billion to $3.8 billion) 
while worldwide audit fees rose 51 percent (from $4.9 billion to $7.4 billion).  This increase 
means that non-U.S. tax fees rose 74 percent in two years from $1.2 billion to $2.0 billion.  
Meanwhile, non-U.S. audit revenues were up 52 percent from $3.1 billion to $4.6 billion.   24
Other data, however, suggest that Deloitte & Touche’s increase in tax fees may be 
exceptional.  Data from a trade publication, the Public Accounting Report, reveal that aggregate 
U.S. tax fees for the Big Four increased from approximately $5.5 billion in 2002 to 
approximately $6.0 billion in 2003, a one-year increase of approximately 9%.  Excluding 
Deloitte & Touche, however, aggregate U.S. tax fees increased by only 2.6%.  Nevertheless, at 
least for 2002-2003, we detect no evidence of a drop in aggregate U.S. tax fees. 
Finally, it appears that attorneys have increased market share as a result of restrictions on 
auditor-provided tax services.  PricewaterhouseCoopers vice-chairman John O'Connor reportedly 
estimates that his firm has lost about 3 percent of its tax practice to law firms.
21  Because law 
firms do not routinely disclose the percentage of their revenue from areas of legal practice (e.g., 
general corporate, litigation, tax), we are unable to further quantify the extent of this possible 
shift in market share to law firms.  
   
4.  Industry Restructuring 
As would be expected, restrictions on auditor-provided tax services are affecting both 
auditors and tax professionals.  In its review of 2004, Ernst & Young notes “…the shifting 
market [for publicly-traded audit clients] is having an unprecedented impact on our people, with 
our assurance and risk services resources strained to capacity, while activity has softened in other 
service areas, most notably tax planning” (Global Review 2004, p.14).   
As the tax work has moved among firms, some tax experts have switched accounting 
firms.  Others have left accounting firms for other tax practices, such as law or consulting firms, 
that are unencumbered by these new restrictions.  Also, new tax services providers are emerging 
in wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley restrictions.  For example, Alvarez and Marsal, a global 
                                                           
21 http://www.cfoasia.com/archives/200402-05.htm    25
professional service firm, expanded into tax consulting in 2004.  In a January 2005 press release 
announcing the hiring of eight prominent tax professionals, Bob Lowe, head of their tax practice, 
said:  
“The need for management teams and boards of directors to maintain 
independence from their auditors has led to increased scrutiny of tax services 
provided by an audit firm.  This need for independent tax advisors has begun to 
spur an exodus of senior tax professionals from Big Four accounting firms….we 
continue to attract the industry’s leading tax professionals who are excited by the 
opportunity to work with a multidisciplinary firm that does not and will not 
perform audits.  Since we will not offer audit services, our Managing Directors 
will not be faced with the types of independence conflicts that hinder a Big Four 
firm tax partner’s ability to serve clients.” 
  
Alvarez and Marsal has met resistance in its attempt to build a major tax practice of former Big 
Four tax professionals.  After Alvarez and Marsal hired 13 tax consultants from Ernst & Young, 
the accounting firm sued them for raiding its personnel, interfering with its business and 
misappropriating confidential information.  In a Wall Street Journal article (March 18, 2005, 
C1), the tax consultants claimed that they were fleeing the constraints of Sarbanes-Oxley.   
Leaving an accounting firm can be costly for partners. They can lose substantial capital 
and retirement benefits and face lengthy covenants-not-to-compete, which can thwart their 
ability to pursue clients of their former firm or recruit former colleagues.  One tax partner 
privately told us that he switched Big Four firms so that he could continue to provide tax services 
to the clients that he had worked with for the last 20 years.  However, his covenant-not-to-
compete precludes his soliciting former clients or rebuilding his staff with former colleagues for 
two years.  Nevertheless, he concluded that his skills were so client-specific that he would be 
better off to wait two years and pursue his former clients, rather than begin now to rebuild his tax 
practice with non-audit clients.       26
Moreover, firm-specific skills and relationships are costly to replicate.  Entire careers are 
devoted to applying highly technical skills to a single firm.  The tax director of one of the 
country’s largest financial service firms privately told us that it would take years to develop the 
firm-specific tax and business expertise that currently resides among the tax consultants at the 
accounting firm that has conducted its audit for decades.   
An alternative to employee reshuffling is that the Big Four accounting firms could spin-
off or sell their tax practices, thus eliminating the Sarbanes-Oxley constraints.  Each firm 
acknowledges that it has considered dividing.  However, to date, no firm has taken this final step.   
We understand that to facilitate division, one of the Big Four has moved its tax practice to a 
separate corporation, although retaining the same management.    
In the past, significant opportunities existed to sell tax services more effectively and at 
lower cost to one’s audit clients.  This created an economic attraction that caused tax and audit 
specialists to operate synergistically in the large accounting firms.  Today, it appears quite 
possible that the former attraction is now repulsion.  As the data on the decline of tax fees 
coming from audit clients indicate, tax specialists in many cases appear effectively precluded 
from the very work that used to be nearly guaranteed.  Based on the dramatic changes already 
evident in the data, we are skeptical that a net synergy remains to having tax and audit specialists 
in the same firm as their respective client bases diverge from one another.   To be sure, auditing 
firms will always need some tax specialists to assist with the tax provision, e.g., auditing the tax 
numbers that appear in the financial statements.  But provision work would surely require only a 
small fraction of the tax specialists that currently work for the large accounting firms.  In 
addition, the career path for a tax professional who only does provision work is likely less 
profitable than one involving tax consulting and planning.   27
Ironically, Sarbanes-Oxley is providing both the pressure to split audit and tax practices 
and the force to hold them together, at least for now.  Tax partners, as discussed above, have an 
incentive to press for an organizational structure unencumbered by Sarbanes-Oxley restrictions.
22  
However, Sarbanes-Oxley and particularly its section 404 internal control documentation are 
currently generating unprecedented audit fees.  Since audit and tax partners tend to share profits 
somewhat equally, Big Four audit partners today are said to be heavily subsidizing their tax 
colleagues.  In other words, one explanation for the lack of audit-tax division within the Big Four 
is that the Sarbanes-Oxley boost to audit fees exceeds its disruption to tax practices.  Thus, an 
audit-tax split may be inevitable, but it may be temporarily delayed until the audit profits from 
Sarbanes-Oxley dissipate.  In the long run, however, large cross-partner subsidies could cause 
instability, as it reportedly did in the eventual break up of Arthur Andersen and Andersen 
Consulting (now Accenture) in the 1990s.    
Another factor that increases the incentive to sell or split-off part of the Big Four tax 
practices is that the explicit and implicit restrictions on auditor-provided tax services 
substantially shrinks the competition for both services.  The restriction effect would be 
immaterial if the pool of prospective accounting firms was large.  Instead, the “Big Four” 
accounting firms—Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCooopers—
audit almost every large company in the country.  Their audit market share exceeds 99 percent of 
the market capitalization of S&P 500, and they provide similar portions of the external tax 
accounting advice for these companies.  Moreover, for most corporations, the pool of prospective 
auditors and tax accountants is even smaller than four firms because the firms specialize along 
industry lines.  Consequently, once the auditor is removed as a tax service provider, many 
                                                           
22 The potentially catastrophic costs associated with failed audits (as seen in Arthur Andersen’s collapse) is another 
reason for tax practitioners to separate from auditing firms.   28
companies realistically only have only one or two other accounting firms to access for tax 
expertise. 
At first it might seem natural that the large law firms acquire tax practices from the 
accounting firms or gradually acquire the underlying work and add personnel over time.  Indeed, 
one could imagine a great deal of synergy to having tax accountants and tax lawyers working in 
the same firm.  In fact, that is precisely the direction the Big Four were going in the 1990s as 
they hired a significant number of tax attorneys, sometimes at considerable premiums over what 
they were making in their former law firms.
23  Anecdotally, this migration is reversing with tax 
attorneys returning to law firms.   
Although synergies exist between the work that tax accountants and tax lawyers do, law 
firms are unlikely to acquire large portions of the Big Four tax practice for at least two reasons.  
The first reason is size.  The law market is highly fragmented.  Even the largest law firms are 
tiny compared with the Big Four accounting firms.  Consequently, no law firm is large enough to 
acquire the entire tax practice of even the smallest Big Four firm.  As of 2003, the largest law 
firm in the U.S. had revenues of approximately $1.3 billion, and only three other U.S. law firms 
had revenues in excess of $1 billion.
24  Moreover, the tax practice within the law firms would be 
only a small fraction of the total revenues; the majority likely being general corporate work and 
litigation work.  By comparison, the U.S. tax practice of the Big Four in 2003 ranged from nearly 
$1.2 billion for KPMG to almost $1.9 billion for Ernst & Young.
25  In short, the U.S. tax 
practices of the Big Four are indeed deserving of the “big” moniker, exceeding in size the entire 
tax and non-tax practices of all but the very largest U.S. law firms. 
                                                           
23 This practice led to several legal skirmishes about whether the tax attorneys working at the Big Four were 
improperly engaging in the practice of law, and the limitations, if any, on a tax attorney after he moved from a law 
firm to a Big Four accounting firm. 
24 These data come from the “Am Law 100” list complied by The American Lawyer (July 2004).  The four largest 
law firms per the Am Law 100 are Skadden Arps, Baker & MacKenzie, Jones Day, and Latham & Watkins. 
25 These data are from the Public Accounting Report “Top 100 for 2004,” September 14, 2004.   29
The second reason not to expect law firms to acquire major portions of the Big Four tax 
practice is regulatory; in this case a restriction on law firms.  We understand that, in most 
jurisdictions, law firms are not permitted to share profits with non-lawyers.  In other words, law 
firms are regulated to be “pure” law firms, making it nearly impossible for law firms to expand 
into other lines of business.  (These rules also effectively shield law firms from being taken over 
by anything other than another law firm.)   
Furthermore, it is unlikely that large amounts of existing Big Four tax work could shift to 
law firms in the absence of their ability to hire tax accountants because accounting tax and legal 
tax skills are not fully interchangeable.  A good deal of tax work, including most compliance 
work and some consulting work, is not well suited for lawyers because it is quantitative rather 
than verbal.  As a gross simplification, tax lawyers tend to have a comparative advantage in 
verbal aspects of taxation (e.g., interpretation of the case law surrounding the assignment of 
income doctrine) while tax accountants tend to have a comparative advantage in quantitative 
aspects of taxation (e.g., analyzing the tax costs and benefits of various repatriation strategies).   
However, other entities that do not face such constraints could have synergies with tax 
specialists.  For example, strategic consulting firms, such as McKinsey, could have synergies 
with tax to the extent their existing work gives them enough knowledge of the client’s business 
to facilitate cross-selling of tax services.  Human Resources consulting firms, such as Mercer, 
already employ some tax specialists and could see that work grow as they face less competition 
from their clients’ audit firms.  IT consulting firms such as Accenture and IBM, could have 
synergies with process oriented aspects of tax, such as compliance.  Investment and commercial 
banks could conceivably find it worthwhile to offer a broad range of tax services, as the selling 
of tax services can sometimes lead to high margin work implementing the transactions needed to   30
carry out the tax planning.  In short, even with no wholesale split of the Big Four tax practices, 
portions of the tax work could move to non-audit professional firms over time as those firms see 
an opportunity to enter the market or acquire pieces of the Big Four tax practices. 
 
5.  Unintended Consequences: More Corporate Tax Collections 
We expect to see a chilling effect on tax avoidance activities.  These strategies have been 
the subject of much research and speculation, and observers have pointed to the growing gap 
between book and tax income over the 1990s as evidence of increased corporate tax avoidance 
activities (see Plesko, 2004; Hanlon and Shevlin, 2004; Mills, Newberry and Trautman, 2002; 
among others)). One unintended consequence of having a different provider of tax services than 
one’s auditor could be to reduce the level of corporate tax aggressiveness and increase corporate 
tax collections.   
We expect that auditors will be far less willing to accept tax planning strategies 
developed by a rival firm than by their tax colleagues down the hall.  Anecdotal reports support 
the expectation that auditors are requiring much more detail in the workpapers supporting the 
“tax cushion.”  The tax cushion is the reserve that companies maintain to account for the 
positions they have taken on their tax returns that they may lose once audited by the IRS.  Under 
certain conditions, IRS auditors can request/demand to see a company’s tax accrual workpapers, 
including the tax cushion, which can serve as roadmap to the parts of the tax return the company 
would rather the IRS not scrutinize.  Now the roadmap, because of changes in the audit market, 
is increasingly detailed.  It is possible that the financial statement auditor has become the single 
most effective deterrent against aggressive tax avoidance strategies.  To test this prediction, one 
would need data on taxes paid, financial reporting tax expense, and the shift in obtaining tax 
services from one’s auditor to other service providers.   31
Having said that, it is not obvious that collections will increase.  Another possibility is 
that tax planners will become more aggressive now that they are no longer impeded by their 
audit partners.  In the past, tax advisers from the audit firm suffered if the audit failed.  No longer 
bearing the costs of an audit failure, tax advisers may press for increasingly aggressive positions.    
If so, the restrictions placed on auditor-provided tax services could actually serve to increase tax 
avoidance.   
Another possible effect could come from as auditors become privy to the latest tax 
technology at competitor firms and can share this information with the tax advisors in their firms. 
In equilibrium, this could cause tax consultants to reserve their best tax ideas – those that save 
taxes at low risk – for clients that continue to use them for both audit and tax.  
It will take a good deal of research before we can conclusively resolve the revenue effects 
of decoupling audit and tax services.  We expect that the net result of the restrictions on auditor-
provided tax services will be an increase in tax collections.  Auditors, as the final arbitrators of 
the financial statements, should prevail in most cases against highly aggressive tax advisers from 
other firms because auditors can demand complete disclosure in a timely manner from the tax 
adviser.  Our expectation, however, relies critically on the assumption that auditors choose to 
maintain an aggressive posture toward manipulation of the financial statements and demand full 
disclosure of the firm’s tax position.  If auditors shrink from the heightened tension between 
them and tax advisors, then tax planning could indeed become more aggressive. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
Following Sarbanes-Oxley, accountants have dramatically reduced the tax work that they 
conduct for audit clients, while increasing the amount of tax work that they do for non-audit   32
clients.  We estimate that from 2001 to 2004 the typical company went from paying its auditor 
the same for audit and tax services to paying the auditor only one-fourth as much for tax services 
as for audit services.  This decline is reshaping the landscape for corporate tax consulting. 
The future is still hazy, but a few predictions seem plausible.  One, because auditors in 
the past had competitive advantages over other tax service providers, corporate taxes and the 
costs of tax avoidance will increase.  Two, although Sarbanes-Oxley and related changes have 
reduced or eliminated the synergies that once existed between providing both audit and tax 
services to the same client, high audit fees are providing a short-term incentive for tax partners to 
stay in auditing firms.  In the long-run, if this tend continues we anticipate instability and the 
eventual sale or spin-off of significant portions of the Big Four tax practices.  Even if no firm 
spins-off or sells its tax line of business, some non-trivial amount of tax work will migrate to 
non-audit firms, including law firms, consulting firms, and investment and commercial banks.    
Three, a consequence of the decoupling of tax and audit services is that when the auditor reviews 
the tax provision, he is no longer judging tax strategies developed by his own firm.  
Consequently, we predict that auditors will be more likely to require the client to record tax 
cushion for aggressive tax positions to protect against the financial reporting tax expense from 
being understated.  Furthermore, the financial auditors are increasingly requiring detailed 
workpapers backing up the tax provision.  This documentation will serve as a roadmap for the 
IRS in subsequent corporate tax return audits. These forecasts reflect the massive impact that the 
accounting scandals, Sarbanes-Oxley, and related regulatory changes have already had on the 
world of corporate tax planning; effects that will continue to reverberate for years to come.   
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Appendix 
Allstate’s Disclosure of the Fees Paid to Deloitte & Touche in its 2002 Financial Statements 
 
The following fees have been, or will be, billed by Deloitte & Touche LLP, the member firms of 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and their respective affiliates, for professional services rendered to 






Audit Fees(1)  $  6,063,752 $  5,275,465
Audit Related Fees(2)  $  963,328 $  213,365
Tax  Fees(3)  $ 81,551  $ 99,374
All Other Fees(4)  $  61,807 $  624,735
    
 Total Fees  $  7,170,338 $  6,212,939
 
 
(1)Fees for audits of annual financial statements, reviews of quarterly financial statements, statutory audits, audit 
services, comfort letters, consents and review of documents filed with the Commission. 
  
(2) Audit Related Fees relate to professional services such as accounting consultations relating to new accounting 
standards, due diligence assistance and audits of non-consolidated entities (i.e. employee benefit plans, various 
trusts, Allstate Foundation, etc.) and are set forth below. The fees associated with the 2001 audits of these entities 
(totaling $416,150) were not included in last year's Proxy Statement.  
 
 




Adoption of New Accounting Standards   $  16,610 $  169,612
Due Diligence   $  479,861 $  23,903
Audits of Non-consolidated Entities   $  432,010 $  —
Other   $  34,747 $  19,850
      
   Audit Related Fees   $  963,228 $  213,365
 
(3) Includes fees for tax compliance, consultation and planning  
 
(4) All Other Fees primarily include professional fees for consulting services related to financial and non-financial 







Strategic Planning  $  40,727 $  —
Non-Financial Information Systems  $  — $  445,353
Business Consulting  $  — $  67,580
Lease Consulting  $  7,710 $  62,804
Financial Information Systems Design &  $  — $  9,160 
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Implementation 
Other  $ 13,370  $ 39,838
    
 All Other Fees  $  61,807 $  624,735
  
NOTE:    Audit, Audit Related and All (Non-Audit Related) Fees for 2001 were reclassified to present them in 
accordance with prospective expanded disclosure requirements. Consents for product filings and 
registration fees ($483,200) previously classified as Audit Related are now considered Audit Fees. Tax 
services ($99,374) were included as All Other Fees in the 2001 Proxy Statement and are now in a separate 
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Variable Year Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl
2001 0.37 0.53 0.28 0.35 0.39
2002 0.27 0.44 0.24 0.32 0.37 -0.11 ** -0.01 ***
2003 0.43 1.82 0.25 0.33 0.37 0.16 0.00 ***
2001 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.07
2002 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.01 ** 0.00 ***
2003 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.03 *** 0.01 ***
2001 25,339.14 49,114.19 4,833.19 8,122.73 23,505.92
2002 20,302.69 36,099.98 3,774.66 7,259.04 17,602.39 -5,013.80 *** -790.62 ***
2003 25,043.94 44,319.41 4,999.97 9,729.73 23,824.91 4,741.25 *** 2,080.21 ***
2001 40,968.09 105,274.56 4,044.10 12,473.50 28,617.61
2002 43,086.41 112,548.50 4,178.43 13,833.50 29,577.50 2,322.99 ** 342.65 ***
2003 47,615.94 128,285.59 4,984.91 14,565.25 30,375.77 3,899.24 *** 737.71 ***
2001 15,579.06 25,518.33 2,683.53 7,125.32 16,937.50
2002 14,785.10 24,783.36 2,742.14 6,964.18 15,756.00 -793.96 ** -40.55 ***
2003 16,125.55 26,957.91 3,023.66 7,771.50 17,235.25 1,340.45 *** 417.09 ***
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
Sample consists of S&P 500 firms with available tax and audit fee data for 2001 to 2003
N=248
Median of Yearly 
Differences
Market Value of Equity
Return on Assets





***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.  Market Value of Equity is price multiplied by shares outstanding at the fiscal year end.  Total assets and sales are 
compustat items #6 and #12, respectively.  Effective tax rate is income tax expense divided by pretax income.  Return on Equity is Net Income divided by Shareholders Equity at the fiscal year 
end.  Means and medians of yearly differences are means and medians of firm specific differences.  Means are tested using a t-test, medians are tested using the sign-rank test. 
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Variable Year Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl
2001 3.16 4.47 0.55 1.50 3.48
2002 2.83 4.17 0.49 1.20 2.98 -0.33 *** -0.07 ***
2003 2.53 4.03 0.43 1.11 2.35 -0.30 ** -0.10 ***
2001 3.99 5.15 1.16 2.31 4.37
2002 5.05 6.23 1.31 2.70 5.72 1.06 *** 0.38 ***
2003 5.70 7.31 1.59 3.01 6.12 0.65 *** 0.34 ***
2001 1.70 2.65 0.27 0.72 1.99
2002 1.44 2.71 0.21 0.50 1.53 -0.26 ** -0.04 ***
2003 1.50 2.81 0.27 0.60 1.35 0.06 0.01 ***
2001 5.70 7.17 1.63 3.10 6.40
2002 6.49 8.33 1.77 3.42 7.46 0.80 *** 0.24 ***
2003 7.20 9.54 1.92 3.92 8.50 0.70 *** 0.39 ***
2001 3.72 9.01 0.04 0.43 2.50
2002 2.06 8.48 0.00 0.11 0.89 -1.66 *** -0.10 ***
2003 0.45 2.09 0.00 0.02 0.16 -1.61 *** -0.03 ***
2001 12.57 17.28 3.05 6.21 14.15
2002 11.38 16.99 2.73 5.32 11.32 -1.19 ** -0.10 ***
2003 10.17 13.64 2.71 5.43 10.75 -1.20 *** 0.03 ***
2001 0.96 1.07 0.33 0.68 1.26
2002 0.71 1.15 0.23 0.48 0.85 -0.25 *** -0.12 ***
2003 0.48 0.47 0.16 0.36 0.62 -0.24 *** -0.08 ***
2001 0.68 0.76 0.24 0.49 0.86
2002 0.53 0.66 0.17 0.38 0.68 -0.15 *** -0.06 ***
2003 0.39 0.39 0.13 0.31 0.53 -0.14 *** -0.05 ***
All Other Fees Paid to Auditor
Total Fees Paid to Auditor
Mean of Yearly 
Differences
***,**,* indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.  Audit fees, audit related fees, tax fees, other fees and total fees are as reported in the footnotes to the financial statements.  
The tax fee to audit fee ratio is tax fees divided by audit fees.  Means and medians of yearly differences are means and medians of firm specific differences.  Means are tested using a t-test, 
medians are tested using the sign-rank test.
Tax Fee to Audit Fee Ratio
Tax Fee to Expanded Audit Fee 
Ratio
Expanded Audit Fees (Audit Fees + 
Audit-Related Fees)





Tax Fees and Audit Fees and Paid to Auditors 
Sample consists of S&P 500 firms with available tax and audit fee data for 2001 to 2003
N=248
Tax Fees
 